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Abstract- The paper addresses the issues of detection of cases of violations of economic competition by various 
undertakings (enterprises) such as the prohibited agreements, abuse of dominant position or other discriminatory practices, 
more efficient treatment in courts of such cases and easier resolution of initiated cases. Besides the national laws governing 
the protection and development of unfair competition from anticompetitive practices, market regulators, in particular 
national authorities for protection of competition tend to find easier methods of detecting violators of the market rules. 
Among the programs that apply in the EU two are the most important: the leniency program and the program of the 
settlements. Also during analyses and easier detection of cases there are two economic indicators which alerts for possible 
violation of competition. The paper treats the functioning of these programs and other indicators implemented by the 
national authorities of competition. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The creation of a market economy and the free operation 
of market mechanisms is an important objective for 
sustainable economic development. The realization of this 
objective imposes the need for decision-makers to create 
such economic policies tailored by appropriate legislation, 
which will affect economic growth through competitive 
market on one side and the other side to eliminate 
behaviors that undermine the free market (Gavil, A. I., 
Kovacic, W. E., and Baker, J. B., Cases, Concepts and 
Problems in Competition Policy. 2002)[6]. 
Implementation of the law on protection of competition 
from institutions for the protection of competition, other 
laws of commercial law as well as the development of 
genuine competition policy (anti-trust) for the purpose of 
its promotion between competitors in the market and 
increasing competitiveness is continuously working for 
benefits all market players (Bernad Fillips, OECD 2007). 
It can be said that the protection and development of 
competition achieved through two main pillars 
Competition Law and Policy Competitions (Mark A. Dutz 
and Maria Vagliasindi, 2000).  In the context of 
competition law include: control of cartels, controlling the 
concentration and control of abuse of dominant position 
(Monti, October 2002)[9]. Whereas within the 
competition policies are included: Economic activities of 
economic regulators as well as economic policies where 
the competition is violated (Steven M. Sheffrin, 
Economics: Principles in action, 2003)[11]. National 
authorities to protect and promote economic competition 
in the implementation of laws for the protection of 
competition and the development of competition policy 
(anti-trust) encounter difficulties detection of cases of 
violation of competition in particular forms of prohibited 
agreements (cartels) or abuse of a dominant position of 
enterprises with sensitive impact on the market EU 
Directives, in particular article 81, 82 and 87 which deal 
with cases relating to prohibited agreements, abuse of 
dominant position, merger, dissolution or merging of 
enterprises with spar impact on the market and the 
treatment of state aid (Regulation 1/2003, on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the Treaty). The discovery of 
these cases is not easy, especially when dealing with 
secret agreements which are considered as actions which 
mostly affect trade, consumer, competitive enterprises and 
its economy. For this purpose the national authorities of 
EU member states on protection of competition, in 
addition to compliance procedures regarding the 
beginning of the investigations which are established by 
laws also apply modern programs of their discovery. 
These programs enable increased efficiency of handling 
cases, easier detection and resolving them, where this 
benefit at the time of treatment, reduce costs and reduce 
penalties for violators of the laws. Some of the programs 
and useful indicators used in the EU countries, which 
consistently use the competition research experts are: 
leniency program (Leniency application), the use of tools 
program (Settlements), the HHI index, SNIP test, the 
damage theory and the index of the profit margin. 
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2. LENIENCY POLICY-PROGRAMS 
Leniency policy together with investigative tools 
available to the competition authorities in the EU 
countries have been very successful tools in the fight 
against cartels (agreements), their detection and setting 
penalties. Basically softness policy, companies involved 
in a cartel self report and submit evidence and to have 
those actions have a kind of immunity for setting the fine 
or reduction of fines from the Competition Commission. 
Leniency policy has a deterrent effect on cartel formation 
and it destabilizes the work of existing cartels because it 
creates mistrust and suspicion to potential members of the 
conclusion of prohibited agreements between the 
participating members of the cartel. In order to enjoy total 
immunity from a company under the mitigation policy, 
should it before inform the Commission to enter into this 
agreement, should provide sufficient information to allow 
the Commission to launch an inspection on the premises 
of companies with suspicion of being involved in cartel. If 
the Commission is already in possession of enough 
information to launch an inspection or has taken such 
inspection a company must provide evidence that enables 
the Commission to prove cartel violation. However, in all 
cases, the company must fully cooperate with the 
investigation throughout the Commission, ensuring cause 
of all evidence in the possession in order to be assigned 
punishment and immunity for registration. The company 
cannot benefit from immunity if it had taken steps to 
coerce others about the agreement and if it is the first one 
that signed it, immunity can enjoy other participating 
companies unless of course they notify the case to the 
Competition. Committee Companies that qualifies for 
immunity may benefit from a reduction of fines if they 
provide evidence to be considered "reliable and value-
added for decision “. If such evidence is complete enable 
so finding of violation of competition, companies can 
enjoy reductions in certain proportion and that, to that of 
the first companies have announced cartel, reduction may 
be: a) 30 to 50% b) for the second from 20 to 30% and c) 
subsequent companies up to 20% (European competition 
network). To take advantage of the notification, 
companies can approach the Commission, directly or 
through their legal advisers. To apply for this program to 
relieve them they can contact the responsible persons of 
Competition authorities in particular and address the 
information treated as confidential and stored 
confidentially by the Commission (OECD, Report on 
Regulatory Reform, Volume II, 1997).   
3. PROGRAM FROM USING TOOLS-
SETTLEMENTS 
Settlements used by the Competition Commission to 
speed up the procedure for making a decision related only 
to a cartel agreement, the parties accept the objections of 
the competent authority of competition, and in return 
(versus-reward) receive a reduction of the fine for up to 
10 %. These programs (the gentleness and use of tools) 
share the common goal of detecting and preventing of the 
market- cartel offenses including self-reporting by the 
offenders and cooperation with authorities through whose 
promise made by the Competition Authority for treatment 
with mild cases and reduction of sentence. The solution is 
a tool that aims to simplify, speed up and shorten the 
procedure leading to the adoption of a formal decision, 
saving human resources department of the cartel. Using 
tools are mutually beneficial to the Competition agencies, 
courts and course participants signing cartel agreements. 
Benefits may be in many ways: a) Saving time and 
resources, b) Momentum and cooperation, c) 
transparency, d) proportionality, d) closure, e) security. 
Types of settlement systems in place or envisaged in each 
jurisdiction are dependent on the legal and procedural 
framework of the relevant jurisdiction. Cartel 
enforcement regimes vary across the world, and type of 
settlement system that can be used successfully in any 
jurisdiction is necessarily dependent on a variety of 
factors, including: type of enforcement regime; cartel 
participants to be applied; penalties available; broader 
legal framework, constitutional and policy.  
3.1. Interaction Of The Leniency Program 
And Settlements 
Using the tools for the detection and treatment of cases 
dealing with prohibited cartel agreement and softness 
programs they are often intertwined with many of the 
same benefits and, in some jurisdictions, share common 
goals (The World Bank, OECD: A Framework for the 
Design and Implementation of Competition Law and 
Policy, Chapter 6, at 93, 1998).  Settlements are not an 
investigative tool, but an effective instrument, use of tools 
and tenderness are closely related, but serve different 
purposes. Complementary, the softness and the program 
means the program make cumulative reductions of fines 
and facilitate the resolution of cases. The last decade has 
begun to spread the programs of softness around the 
world. Today over 40 jurisdictions apply certain types of 
leniency program allowing participants in the cartel report 
itself cartel behavior, to cooperate with the Authority and 
receive immunity from prosecution or a reduction in 
fines. Key issues included in the use of these tools are: 
transparency, predictability and security. Transparency is 
vital for an effective payment system that the cartel." 
Transparency "and related terms" predictability "and" 
security "are the basic principles in the implementation of 
anti-cartel policy (Mark A and Maria Vagliasindi 2000). 
Parties, through these programs want to know in advance 
what will be the benefits of self-reporting case, what risks 
they to enter into discussions to resolve cases and how we 
would have acceptable solution. 
3.2. How it Works in Practice the Use of 
Settlements? 
Three steps can be identified in the process of settlement: 
The first consists in the presentation of violation that the 
Commission sees the various companies involved in the 
cartel. Secondly, things are dealing with a series of 
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discussions aimed at clarifying certain points, which 
culminates in finding a common understanding between 
the Commission and the parties; each party describes the 
violation in order to influence the decision to reduce the 
fine. Thirdly, it includes full disclosure of the cartel by the 
commission and setting the maximum amount of the fine 
related to the conduct of the company, and reductions of 
sentences. The main issues usually addressed during 
discussions of the use of means for selecting a case- cartel 
are: who will enter the solution? What the offense will 
cover solutions? It would require an admission of guilt in 
order to solve? What cooperation will give the party 
solution? Are there other works of the cartel and, if so 
participants can report? Which would be a punishment or 
penalty? Key elements to use the tools to solve the cartel 
are: 1) Admission of guilt or factual basis, 2) The 
punishment or imposition of a fine, 3) Cooperation with 
participants in the cartel, 4) agreement not to bring further 
charges from the competition authority and reconciliation 
for non-processing of the case to the Court. Key 
procedural elements of the cartel which should be taken 
are: a) the beginning and the initiation of the use of these 
tools cartel, b) the role of judges and public archiving of 
documents, c) the confidentiality of the discussions and 
resolution of the cartel, d) withdrawal from a cartel 
agreement) acceptance of infringement upon the 
conclusion of a cartel agreement and f) voluntarily, the 
court, acceptance and review.  
Using the tools cartel agreements can provide great 
benefits to the authorities, to the participants of the cartel, 
courts, victims and the general public by persuading 
members of the cartel through transparent promise, 
proportionate to accelerate, secure, and final provisions - 
to collaborated at the beginning and accept responsibility 
for their cartel behavior.  
4. INDEX - IHH 
The Herfindahl's Index, also known as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman's index or (HHI) is the index which measures 
the size of the firm in relation to relevant industry and an 
indicator of the firm's participation in this industry. This 
index is named by economists Orris C. Herfindahl and 
Albert O. Hirschman (Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index" USDOJ. Retrieved 4 May 2012). This index 
applies competition law, anti-trust and also in the wider 
managements. This index indicates participation in the 
company’s market scale and measures its concentration in 
the market. The growth of this indicator (Herfindahl 
index) shows that we have to deal with competition 
falling and at the same time increasing the company's 
market power, which does not have enough competition, 
and vice versa reduction of this indicator shows that there 
is sufficient competition and falling the market power of 
the company. Specific measurement tool of market 
concentration is the degree to which a small number of 
firms account for a large percentage of the product 
market. HHI is used as a possible indicator of market 
power or competition among firms. The higher the HHI 
has to be a specific market, the more concentrated is the 
product of that market in a small number of firms 
4.1. Ssnip-Test (Small Increase But 
Significant Of Non-Transitory Prices) 
In the analysis of competition test "low growth but 
significant non-transitory price" used to justify 
intervention to the competition authorities that have 
market power companies. It serves to define the relevant 
market in a consistent manner it is an alternative "ad hoc" 
for determining the relevant market arguments relating to 
the similarity of the products and their prices SSNIP test 
is crucial in competition law in order to determine the 
dominant position and concentrations on the block. 
Competition regulatory authorities and other actors in the 
anti-trust law tend to prevent damage to the market which 
is done through: cartel, oligopoly, monopoly and other 
forms of domination in the market. Historic- origin of this 
test is believed to be proposed for the first time in 1959 by 
economist Morris Adelman of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. Me 1982 US Department of Justice in the 
concentrations regulation has also included this test 
SSNIP as a new method for defining the market and direct 
measurements of market power. In EU is used for the first 
time in the case of "Nestlé / Perrier in 1992 and officially 
recognized by the European Commission (Competition 
Directorate) in the document that has to do with the" 
definition of the relevant market "in 1997. Example: The 
test consists of small non-transitory increase observation 
of prices (in percentage from 5 to 10%), and this increase 
would provoke a significant number of customers to 
purchase the product father, on the other substitute 
products.  In other words it helps in the analysis of the 
increase in price and increase profits on the one hand and 
on the other side so indirectly affects products which may 
be replaceable. In economic terms, SSNIP test calculates 
elasticity of demand for a firm, and how to change the 
prices of the company and affected for in its bid (the 
enterprise). 
4.2. Theory of Harm  
Principles of damage based on the actions that companies 
take individuals and their actions cause harm to others. 
For the first time these principles have been articulated by 
the Englishman John Stuart Mill in 1859. Later this theory 
applies in the economy and in particular in the field of 
competition. Competition authorities tend to limit the 
damage to competition from anti-competitive behavior. n 
some specific jurisdictions and laws they seek to quantify 
potential or actual damages in order to prove a violation 
of the law by companies, and calculate administrative 
fines or use for advocacy purposes . Based on this theory 
when taking decisions in administrative procedures 
national courts treat this theory and then bring meritorious 
decisions. This theory is used as a kind of argument by 
the competition authority in imposing any penalty for 
anti-competitive behavior (abuse of dominant position). 
Often for this purpose engage external experts to which 
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justified the harm caused or not (Friedriszik and Roller, 
2010). Competition damage the treated part of the overall 
damage to the economy and the damage caused to the 
customer, it is also the focus of competition authorities in 
case of handling cases. 
4.3. The Profit Margin Indicator 
In traditional and modern economies, all firms try to 
maximize the profit which is the difference between total 
revenue and total expenditure. In situations where 
dominant companies achieves maximum profits by 
increasing product prices offered in the market and no 
reduction in costs or an increase in the production cost 
price, this indicator can be taken as an element during the 
investigation of a company which alleged abuses of a 
dominant position or market power (Boundless 
economics. “Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost 
Relationship for Monopoly Production”, 2014).  The 
marginal cost (MC) changes in the total cost associated 
with changes in inputs. The marginal cost is the difference 
between total production costs when moving to a unit. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A market economy is functional and successful operation 
has as a condition of all laws. These laws are necessary to 
realize the benefits of the market economy and free trade. 
Competition law protects market avoiding and preventing 
not only improper practices of private entities, but also 
from state interference through normative acts performed 
by him. To be successful in implementing this policy, the 
law enforcement activities of the competition institutions 
should be characterized by independence, transparency, 
professionalism and effectiveness. Competition Policy as 
one of the foundations of the market economy can be 
effective, as long as they are clear priorities set by 
policymakers.  Basic mission of competition policy is to 
eliminate possible market distortions, thus creating a 
competitive market development, which will continue to 
lead development and general welfare of society.  The 
Competition Authorities, which enforces the law on 
protection of competition, protection and development of 
competition, should be oriented in two main directions: a) 
Continuous fighting illegal agreements control of 
concentrations and market analysis and market 
competition and b) Follow-up the laws and other legal 
acts which as such can create favors to certain monopoles 
and their improvement. It is necessary that the authority 
for protection of competition have regular cooperation 
with economic regulators (regulator for energy, 
telecommunications, media, and procurement) in order to 
create fair competition. The Competition Authority will 
cooperate with regulatory bodies in examining concrete 
cases, taking the best expertise of regulators areas and 
respecting relevant legislation. It is particularly important 
to become much greater advocacy on the importance of 
competition and recognition with the law on protection of 
competition, as well as to prepare secondary legislation in 
this field. To strengthen the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in specific cases, the authority will 
implement administrative measures against competition 
violations, using effective sanctions and penalties 
provided in cases of abuse of dominant position, cartels 
and control of concentrations. In this context it is very 
important to work on increasing and improving 
investigations in specific cases, application of modern 
programs for the detection and treatment of cases and the 
use of various economic indicators to investigate and deal 
with cases of violation of competition. All these actions 
will create a favorable environment for further 
development of free competition and its protection as one 
of the fundamental condition for sustainable economic 
development and protection of consumers' health.  
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